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LOCKE’S T H E O R Y  OF PERCEPTION 
OHN LOCKE, born three hundred years ago last Au- J gust, was interested primarily in the problem of knowl- 
edge. Therefore, I propose to honor him here, not so much 
by a biographical account of his intellectual life, as by a clear 
statement of certain epistemological propositions he believed 
to be important and true. Such commemoration Locke him- 
self would have preferred, who often declared while he lived 
that the Truth,  not John Locke, should be our concern. 
T h e  propositions that I shall select for  presentation have 
to do with perception. Perception, in Locke’s usage, is a term 
with a wide application. It is not only “the most general 
name for all the operations of the understanding”’ or  the 
mind, such as sensing, remembering, thinking, imagining, 
but also for  the immediate objects of these mental opera- 
tions, such as a sensed patch of blue, a remembered yester- 
day, a thought square root of two, or an imagined unicorn. 
Thus, a theory of perception in this wide sense would be an 
exhaustive analysis of all the ways of knowing, and this is 
precisely what Locke attempts in the Essay. W e  shall not, 
however, take perception in this wide sense as the topic for 
our discussion here. Perception, in twentieth-century theory 
of knowledge, usually means sense-perception. In Locke’s 
own terminology, I am going to present, with an eye for mer- 
its and difficulties, his theory of sensation, which claims to 
describe some of the physical and mental processes involved 
‘J. Gibson, Locke’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 21. “Perception” is synon- 
ymous with “idea.” 
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in the traditional five ways of sensing, together with the 
status of the qualities that are sensed. 
Locke names the subject-matter of his Essay-a part of 
which is sensation-the “Science of Signs,”’ because all per- 
ception makes use of various elements which signify others 
beyond them. Even colors and odors “mean” the presence 
of certain kinds of bodies in the external world. Hence it is 
clear that such a science, being in part  a description of how 
mind communicates with matter, must overlap the science of 
mind on the one hand, and the science of material existence 
on the other. I shall begin with Locke’s view of physical ex- 
istence, then straddle the borderland between matter and 
mind, and, from the vantage-point of this great divide, sur- 
vey briefly the realm of mind. First, however, I shall per- 
form an experiment to create in us a keen sense for the prob- 
lem of perception, and for the apparent inevitability of 
Locke’s general conclusions in this regard. 
Imagine here before us a small white marble attached to 
the end of a slender steel rod. Now suppose by mechanical 
means we cause the end of the rod that bears the white ob- 
ject to oscillate rapidly between two points about six inches 
apart. W h a t  will you then see? If your line of vision is a t  
right angles to the rod’s plane of oscillation, you will see a 
curved, white, motionless line about six inches long. T h a t  is, 
you will see with your eyes a color apparently qualifying a 
region of space that it does not really qualify. Thus the ar- 
gument collapses that colors must surely be where they seem 
to be from the standpoint of animal perception. But consider 
now the white marble as itself a stationary object lying in the 
palm of your hand. Is it not a solid object, its whiteness 
really existing in the region of space occupied by the marble ? 
T h e  answer of physics is a curt negative. As Russell says, 
Essay, iv, 21, 4. 
240 Public Lectures 
“Much the greater par t  of the volume that seems to  be filled 
. . . is really unoccupied.”’ Wha t  you really hold in the 
palm of your hand is a universe of particles in rapid vibra- 
tory motion. At  this point, therefore, commonsense is in- 
vited to extend the concept of apparent-but-not-real qualifi- 
cation to the white of the marble itself, and for seemingly the 
same reasons as in the case of the rapidly oscillating marble. 
I say “seemingly” the same reasons. T h e  reasons are not all 
really the same. In the first case, we pointed to the existence 
of a white marble in motion to explain the appearance of 
white throughout a region of space larger than the marble 
itself, and we believed that the apparent white was never 
more than six inches away from the real white. In  the second 
case, however, we can no longer speak of white particles 
moving rapidly to produce the appearance of a continuous 
white patch. T h e  ultimate particles of matter are colorless, 
such that it would be false to say that a blade of grass is 
green because its atoms are green. So now we discover that 
the perceived white is not even in the general region of the 
marble a t  all, be it in motion or  a t  rest. Locke would love this 
conclusion, which contains by implication the denial that 
white exists anywhere in the physical world, and which re- 
veals sharply the problem of perception. If qualities may 
appear in normal circumstances to inhere in material bodies 
without, as we have seen, really doing so, how are we to dis- 
tinguish the real properties from the unreal, and where are 
we to locate such as have no physical existence? T h e  answer 
to this question can be developed best by turning now to 
Locke’s own views on matter, mind, and the relation between 
them. W e  shall take material existence first. 
Our illustration of the oscillating particle has indicated 
the content of what Locke called the “corpuscularian”2 hy- 
‘ABC of Atoms, p. 8. 2 iv ,  3,  16. 
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pothesis, which is the one he believes to  be true of matter. It 
is not Locke’s business, he says in the Essay, to make an ex- 
haustive analysis of physical objects and events in them- 
selves, but only so much as will disclose their rbles as terms 
of the perceptual relation. W h a t  he does say however of the 
ultimate particles of matter reveals them as minute solid bits, 
with definite and unalterable outlines, capable of acquiring 
motion only through the impact of other moving particles 
and of lending this borrowed motion to other particles by 
impact. In this hypothesis there is no trace of what, in the 
slang of modern physics, is called the “smear” theory of par- 
ticles, according to which particles do not have definite, solid 
surfaces, but are more like radiations of energy outward 
from an insubstantial nucleus. Locke’s atoms show no signs 
of being energetic or  smudgy. T h e  causal efficacy they pos- 
sess is described as “passive power,” which they exert by be- 
ing hurtled through an empty space and bumping into clear- 
cut opposition, such motion affecting neither the nature of 
the moving particle nor the nature of the space travelled 
through. This billiard-ball conception of the atom is old and 
simple enough, but its simplicity becomes treacherous when 
he who entertains it is called upon to explain the firm cohe- 
sion of the parts of a body and the gravitational attraction 
between bodies. Because it ignores the intricate properties 
of electro-magnetic fields, it is totally a t  a loss to show why, 
for example, a steel spring-supposedly made up of small 
marble-like atoms-should resist disintegration any more 
than a sand heap, which is very easily dispersed. About such 
matters, Locke is frankly ignorant. T h e  cohesion of ultimate 
particles to form bodies, the attraction between bodies-the 
law of which his friend Newton discovered-and even the 
details of the process of imparting motion by impact: these 
three factors constitute, according to Locke, a triple mystery, 
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the bottom of which will probably never be probed by the 
human mind.’ 
Bodies, which are aggregates of cohering atoms, possess 
all the properties exhibited by atoms save one. They have 
shape and size, they move and are numerable, but they are 
not solid in the same absolute sense that atoms are, since they 
are for  the most par t  compressible. These properties of 
“physical substances” are called “primary,” and are such 
that no matter what alteration the body undergoes, it pos- 
sesses them in some form or other as long as it is body a t  all. 
Likewise, bodies have the passive power to be causally af- 
fected by other bodies, by the collision of parts. 
Now that we have described bodily existence, let us indi- 
cate in a word the nature of the space which is the possibility 
of bodily motion. Though Locke held successively three 
fairly distinct views of space,* in the end he completely aban- 
doned the first two and adhered to the theory of absolute 
space, as i t  was propounded in his day by thme Cambridge Pla- 
tonist More and by Newton. This is the view he expressed 
in the Essay. As there described, space is “uniform and 
boundless,” itself unmoved and unalterable by the motion of 
bodies in it. T h e  material universe in space has limits, but 
space itself has none. Take  the extreme opposite of solidity, 
which is the characteristic of body, and you have a character- 
istic of space. 
Now it was necessary to present for our comprehension 
Locke’s conception of this great spatial receptacle, together 
with his conception of the bodies it contains. W e  must under- 
stand clearly the atomic and spatial constitution of our 
1 ii, 23, 24, passim. See also Elements of Natural Philosophy. Wks. Vol. 
2 J. Gibson, op. c k  pp. 248-250. 
111, p. 281. 
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bodies, from this physical point of view, if  we are to  under- 
stand how they communicate with one another, and why 
something more than just matter must be present before per- 
ception of, and by means of, bodies can occur. 
Suppose then we take an enormous number of the ultimate 
particles of matter and, with the skill of a god, put them to- 
gether to form a human body. Now just as putting together 
the same enormous number of marbles would not form a 
living colossus, sowe cannot hope by this kindof juxtaposition 
of parts to form a living body, but we shall, by hypothesis, 
construct one similar in every physical detail to a living 
model. Atom by atom we build it up, till before us lies the 
finished product, trunk, head, and limbs, the whole equipped 
with the five or  more sense-organs. T h e  eyes and the ears 
are open, and are being stimulated by particles and vibra- 
tions from other bodies in the neighborhood. As a result, 
minute motions of the particles in these organs of sense are 
caused which, by impact on impact, are communicated to the 
brain. As yet, however, the causal sequence differs not a whit 
from the bump-and-rebound type that occurs say among the 
particles of a stone, and even the last term of the sequence- 
the effect in the brain-is simply a borrowed motion through 
space. Briefly, we do indeed have before us a physical organ- 
ism, exhibiting extension in space, shape, motion, and nu- 
merous parts, but we plainly do not have before us a living 
organism. In Locke’s words, “whatever impressions are 
made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of 
within, there is no perception.”’ And there is nothing as yet 
within the organism to note what goes on there or  anywhere 
else. An atom or  a group of atoms cannot perceive another, 
be this other either a t  a distance from it or  in spatially im- 
1 i i ,  9 ,  3 .  
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mediate contact. Our marvelously intricate complex of atoms 
is equipped for perceiving, but is as yet totally incapable of 
perception. 
Our survey, beginning in the middle of the field of inani- 
mate nature, has a t  this point brought us to its edge. W e  
discover that, as physicists, we cannot step over the border- 
line without sinking into a veritable quagmire of a queer sort 
of immaterial substance. Indeed, even in probing into the 
constitution of the human organism, we could not help feel- 
ing that our purely physical analysis had banished something 
quite essential from its natural habitat. Permeating what we 
call a living organism is a subtle something which, under 
physical analysis, slips away and escapes detection, leaving 
behind a machine-like structure, capable of operating but 
actually inoperative. 
This, for Locke, is mind or  “immaterial substance.’’ H e  
calls it substance, though it is nothing material, partly be- 
cause i t  was the custom in his day to call anything real a sub- 
stance or  a property of substance, and partly because mind is, 
in Locke’s conception, something that is really localized and 
spread out in the same space through which matter moves. 
Hence i t  is legitimately called substance, a “stuff” capable of 
having distinctive properties of its own which distinguish it 
from the stuff of matter. Just what these properties are we 
shall see as the discussion proceeds, but let us first attempt to  
understand clearly the relation between a mind and the body 
it animates. This will keep us to the proposed line of investi- 
gation. 
Locke, showing his fine commonsense, says quite definitely 
that the mind is where the body is. Whether this is true or  
not, such a conception a t  least makes it possible to have fairly 
“clear and distinct’’ ideas about the body-mind relation. To  
some of us, it may seem unnecessary to argue the point, for 
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i t  is all too obvious that, as Locke himself naively asserted, 
when one’s body moves say from London to Oxford, i t  does 
not leave its mind behind in London. And if it does not, then 
the mind accompanies the body, and is wherever it is, a t  least 
as long as the body continues to live-that is, be animated 
by the mind. But Locke was unorthodox in believing this t o  
be the case. On  the one hand, Descartes had taught that  
mind is in all respects what matter is not, so that if matter is 
localizable and has spatial properties, mind has none of 
them. On the other hand, there was a Scholastic dogma to 
the effect that mind is ubi, or  everywhere, hence can have no 
circles drawn around it t o  give i t  definite position in space. 
W h a t  is more, both the Cartesian and the Scholastic doc- 
trines are supported by much evidence. There seem to be 
many things in the mind to which spatial characteristics sim- 
ply cannot be attached without making sheer nonsense. Such 
questions as, what is the shape and velocity of your idea of a 
billiard ball? are meaningless; yet they ought not t o  be mean- 
ingless i f  the mind which contains such ideas itself has spatial 
dimensions, Moreover, it seems that one can be in thought 
in many places that the body is not occupying or  can never 
occupy, hence the apparent reasonableness of the view that 
mind is everywhere. Be that as it may, Locke assigns a place 
in space to mind, and that place is primarily the position of 
the body that has that mind.’ 
and hence is 
where the body is, Locke never says definitely that it has the 
body’s shape. I mean to say that Locke’s intention is not to 
outline a mind in space as definitely as he outlines its body 
in space, but only to locate it in the general region of the or- 
ganism so as to insure its commerce with the sense-organs. 
But though the mind is “immersed in 
1 i i ,  23, 19-20. 
2 i i i ,  11, 23. 
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Locke rightly believed that the Cartesian doctrine of the 
“nowhereness” of the mind made it impossible to conceive 
how the mind communicates with the body, which obviously 
is somewhere. In  other words, one might say that Locke 
holds to what we have called a “smear” theory, not of the 
atom, but of the mind, which argues that though mind is in 
space and moves through it, no clear-cut boundaries can rea- 
sonably be assigned it, as they can be attributed to material 
objects. I think we could say that the mind accompanies and 
is in the body much in the same way that the sound of a rac- 
ing car accompanies and is in it. Though this sound seems 
to move with the car and is generally where it is, yet, like 
the mind, it cannot be said to have a shape. T h e  mind can- 
not be definitely circumscribed, because it is a kind of ethereal 
substance capable of subtle dilations as when it expands into 
all parts of the organism flooding it with warm feelings and 
sensitizing its peripheries, and also capable, as when one 
sleeps, of “retiring from the senses, out of reach of those 
motions in the organs of sense.”‘ Hence Locke would en- 
dorse the statement that  the more incorporated or  embodied 
a mind becomes, the more definite become its position and 
shape in space ; whereas the more purely mental it becomes 
in retirement from bodily existence, the less definite become 
its spatial properties; such that God, for  example, who ac- 
cording to Locke is pure incorporeal mind, is simply every- 
where a t  once, without delimited position or  date. 
Though it is true that many of Locke’s teachings in this 
regard seem to locate the human mind within-or near-the 
organism as a whole, yet most of his description tends to- 
ward concentrating it, i f  not confining it, in the brain, which 
he calls the “presence room” o r  audience chamber of the 
mind. Into it, messengers from the external world of matter 
ii, 19, 4. 
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are  introduced to signify to mind the nature of the objects 
and events in that  outer world. Indeed, some of his descrip- 
tions can easily be construed to mean that the mind is the in- 
terior region of the skull, as for example his statement that 
the mind is a dark room into which knowledge of the exter- 
nal world is introduced through the windows of the sense- 
organs. Despite such contentions, however, we must not al- 
low ourselves to believe that Locke ever identified the mind 
with parts of the body. Though mind is capable of fusion 
with an organism, it remains nevertheless a distinct sub- 
stance, such that if we held two great magnets on opposite 
sides of a living organism, the one magnet attracting mind 
and the other matter, then all the life of the organism would 
be drawn out one way, and its material substance the other. 
Soul would fly to one magnet, body to  the other. 
Having indicated briefly the relation of the mind to the 
body, I shall now describe in a word or two the main proper- 
ties of mind that distinguish it from matter, all of which will 
have prepared us for the examination of the “what” and the 
“how” of perception itself. 
Perhaps the chief distinguishing trait is the kind of 
“power” that mind exhibits. Locke calls it “active” power, 
and contrasts it with the passive power of matter. Mind is 
active, because it possesses the power to initiate movement, 
whereas matter has only the power to be moved and to  im- 
par t  motion. Hence, if all matter is actually in motion, the 
first cause of this cosmic motion must have been some cosmic 
mind, and this is a part  of Locke’s proof for  the existence of 
a deity. Matter  could not originally have moved itself. 
Mind, then, is peculiarly that kind of thing which can operate 
upon another thing without itself having been mechanically 
caused to do so, though even mind may have moments of 
passivity during which, as we shall see, matter operates upon 
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it to give rise to sensations within it. Another distinguishing 
trait of mind is the elastic continuity‘ and insolidity of its 
elements. Matter is divisible into solid, discontinuous parts. 
Mind is not. Both substances are to us alike in that the inner 
essence or ultimate constitution of each is unknowable. . . . 
Finally we are in a position to narrow down our analysis 
to sense-perception, which is the transaction of the mind with 
physical existence by means of the sense-organs. In order to 
keep the situation clearly before us, let us return to the hu- 
man body we built up out of atoms and which lies here inani- 
mate before us. This is not a t  all Locke’s method of expo- 
sition, but I think he could not complain that it misrepre- 
sents the essentials of his view, and it obviously simplifies 
the task of describing how the mind gets its store of “ideas.” 
Now to animate our hand-made organism, we say presto1 
and behold in its open eyes not only the hard glitter of me- 
chanically reflected light, but also the softer light of-shall 
we say-something that looks out upon you and sees you. 
Physically speaking, no change has occurred in the object be- 
fore us, save perhaps a quickened motion of minute parts. In 
another sense, though, something additional now pervades 
the organism, capacitating it for experience of its own, 
whereas previously not even the shock of the most powerful 
stimulus could have aroused it to become aware of the exist- 
ence of things. This awareness is a property of mind, as 
motion is of matter. 
However, though in a sense this mind is in the body, there 
is as yet nothing in the mind, for we have just now, by hy- 
pothesis, joined it to the body. I t  has not yet any experience, 
hence it is a tabula rasa, a blank sheet, a dark room into 
1 This does not deny Locke’s “composition” theory of mind, but indicates 
rather the “faculties” of the mind, whose “innateness” he asserted, as for 
example in his note on the margin of Burnet’s Remarks o n  the Essay. 
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which light is just a t  this moment beginning to be introduced 
through the avenues of the sense-organs. Until the mind has 
a body, no sensations can be caused in the mind, and until it 
has sensory materials to work upon, it lacks the very founda- 
tion of knowledge and experience. Locke’s whole Essay is 
intended to drive this truth home, and to undermine the op- 
posite well-known doctrine of “innate” ideas, according to 
which knowledge blossoms forth from a source within the 
mind itself, independent of sense-perception. T h e  fountains 
of knowledge are, according to Locke, in things themselves, 
such that the mind’s point of contact with the whole of physi- 
cal reality lies narrowly in the sense-organs of the body. Fo r  
the rationalists Descartes and the Cambridge Platonists, the 
mind contacts ultimate reality only on an intellectual level 
f a r  above-indeed out of the reach of-sensation. Unless we 
get the force of this distinction between a sensory and a 
purely intellectual point of contact with reality, we shall miss 
much of the peculiar significance of Locke. T o  know nature 
truly, one must, i f  Locke is right, get down as it were into 
his bodily senses and perceive out through them the nature of 
things. H e  then contacts the real material world. Subse- 
quently, he may turn inwards to reflect upon the operations 
of his own mind, thus making acquaintance with mental sub- 
stance. But even the most abstract and universal bit of 
knowledge about the material world stands flat-footedly on 
sensation. 
Well, having supplied our body with a mind and the mind 
with a body, sensation occurs, and the hitherto empty mind 
begins to get a store of ideas. Let  us see how these ideas are 
produced and exactly what they are, on the level of percep- 
tion. 
Our animated organism sits up and looks at  the marble we 
used to perform a visual experiment. It sees a patch of white 
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color. Wha t  precisely is happening in the marble, in the eye, 
in the mind, and also between these terms, t o  produce this 
effect ? Here is Locke’s answer :’ globules of light strike the 
surface of the marble and rebound from it. The marble’s 
surface has a texture which gives the rebounding light-par- 
ticles two kinds of motion, rotational and progressive. T h e  
progressive motion of certain of these light-particles carries 
them forward to penetrate the lense of the eye and “to paint 
the image”’ of the marble on the retina of the eye. Let us 
for  the moment construe this so-called “painting” not in the 
literal sense but only in the sense of setting up a colorless 
vibratory response among the material particles of the eye. 
Now to this purely physical motion in the visual organ- 
which may include parts of the brain-a “sensation is an- 
nexed.” This is the white patch that is actually and directly 
seen, and it is in the mind of the percipient. Of course, i f  the 
sensing part  of the mind is in the body, as it seems natural to 
suppose, then it would appear that our patch of white should 
be discoverable somewhere in the body of the observer, as 
well as in his mind. And Locke is not a t  all loath to speak a t  
times as though colors are literally painted on the retina 
and as though it is these retinal images that we directly see 
in ordinary perception of bodies. In one disastrous place- 
not in the Essay-after describing how a retinal image is 
produced by the bombardment of particles, he states that 
this image is seen. But Locke simply dare not mean that the 
color white becomes a literal property of the retina, since 
the retina is every bit as much a material object as the 
marble, and Locke’s whole concern here is to show that colors 
are never immediate qualities in bodies, but only in minds. 
W e  therefore shall ignore this careless statement of his, 
iv, 2, 11-13. 
2 Examination of Malebranche, Wks. Vol. IX, pp. 217-218. 
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especially since on the same page he goes on to  write that the 
motions effected in the retina are continued to  the brain and 
that this chain of intra-organic motions produces sensations 
in  our minds. Thus L,ocke remains unscathed by the demon- 
strations of modern experimental psychology which prove, 
by the relative sizes of retinal images, that the retinal image 
is itself not seen, but rather the shape and size of something 
else. 
Now why is it that when the above-mentioned particles 
rebounding from the marble strike the eye, we see white 
rather than green or blue? T h e  color that is actually pro- 
duced in any given circumstance depends primarily, accord- 
ing to Locke, on the joint rotational and progressive motions 
of the particles of light. Tha t  is, the velocity of approach 
to  the eye and the rate of rotation of the particle d,etermine 
what particular color is to occur, and that color becomes 
more intense as the number of such particles, moving thus, 
increases. To all this let it be added in fairness to Locke, 
that the color white is not to be simply identified with certain 
kinds of motion and texture of parts. Colors stand to such 
motions and physical textures only as mental effects to  ma- 
terial causes. And Locke does not even pretend to have 
detailed knowledge of the way in which the material causes 
produce color-sensations. One thing however he is sure 
about, and that is that sensations are caused in the mind by 
the impact of material particles against the organism, what- 
ever their motions or ultimate natures may be. This is 
called the “causal” theory of perception, and in itself is 
reasonable enough both to  common and to scientific sense, 
though certain of its consequences-which we are about to 
trace-are not nearly so congenial. 
So fa r  we have limited our discussion to the class of visual 
sensations. This was not a t  all necessary to  drive home 
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Locke’s argument on behalf of the causal theory of percep- 
tion. Indeed, it was beginning with that phase of perception 
which is least likely to prove his point.’ Fo r  example, you 
are much more likely to get away with the assertion that the 
taste of an apple is just a sensation in you, than with the 
assertion that the red apparently on its surface is just a sen- 
sation in you. There is something objective about color 
which is wanting in sounds, smells, tastes, and sensations of 
temperature and pain. A pain or a taste may pretty safely 
be said to be where the body is, but are not colors a t  a dis- 
tance from the eye? It is fairly reasonable to say that an 
apple is sweet and cool only in contact with some palate, 
but is it as reasonable to  say that the apple is red only in 
contact with some eye? Certainly, Locke would answer, and 
it is reasonable f o r  the same reasons, because in both cases 
there are in the real apple only certain atoms and aggregates 
of atoms in motion which directly or indirectly strike upon 
the sense-organs to  produce sensations in the mind. Red is a 
sensation, like taste or pain. If a steel wedge were driven 
into the palm of your hand, would you say that the resultant 
pain is in the steel, a quality of the steel, like its solidity? 
If not, why say that the gray-blue sensation you experience 
when the wedge operates upon your eye is in the steel? There 
is, if you will, a slight difference in the two cases, for  in the 
case of pain, the actual bulk of the object is pressed against 
the tactual organs, whereas in the case of gray-blue, the bulk 
of the object is not pressed up against the eye. But it is 
none the less in indirect physical contact with the eye, for 
from its surface a thin regular sequence of light-particles is 
being emitted to the retina, whence rises the gray-blue sensa- 
tion in the mind of the observer. In short, Locke interprets 
‘Locke himself wrote I‘. . . visible species are the most difficult to be 
explained by material causes.” Wks. Vol. IX, p. 215. 
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all perception on the analogy of contact experience. If the 
external body is neither directly nor indirectly in contact 
with the sense-organ, there is no perception; and if the mind 
is not in some sense in contact with the stimulated sense- 
organ, as when in sleep or  death it is “retired from the 
senses,” then again there is no perception. T h e  mind per- 
ceives physical objects only when, from their side, they send 
representatives of themselves to where the sense-organ is, 
and when, from its side, the mind extends itself to be in some 
way or  other where that sense-organ is. Then there is 
contact-and experience. There is no such thing as percep- 
tion a t  a distance. Wha t  the mind directly perceives must 
be immediately in the mind, that is, where the mind is. 
But when of an evening I look out on Jupiter, is not the 
bright orb that I see really millions of miles away from my 
observant self and identical with the real Jupiter? This 
could hardly be the case, since as we well know the real 
Jupiter could suddenly cease to  exist and still the duped ob- 
server would go on seeing his own little yellow luminary 
for  more than half an hour. Locke knew of his Danish 
contemporary Romer, and of his discovery of the finite 
velocity of light, made by observations of the satellites of 
Jupiter. On this basis he criticized the opinion of Paul 
Malebranche that an object millions of leagues away is per- 
ceived the moment i t  is uncovered or  begins to  emit light.’ 
This argument, from the space-time interval between the 
perceiver and the external event causing his perception, is 
perhaps the best available one when it comes to proving that 
what you apprehend in sensation is when and where the sensa- 
tion occurs, not  when and where the rem0t.e external object 
is. It is the argument that certain modern epistemologists 
rely on most to establish such a dualistic theory of perception 
Wks. loc. cit. 
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as we have been describing, and it simply states that there is 
a space-time interval between cause and effect, such that the 
yellow sensation one has on looking at  Jupiter cannot be 
Jupiter itself, since the sensation is effect and Jupiter cause. 
Admit causation between external object and sensation, and 
thereafter you cannot say that what is directly sensed is 
identical with its cause in another part of the universe. 
W e  seem now, with Locke, to have shown that a sensation 
is one thing, and the outer cause of it another. This estab- 
lishes, on a causal basis, the dualistic or  indirect theory of 
perception. But, having revealed the width and depth of the 
mote between sensation and outer cause, we find ourselves 
faced with the necessity of explaining how experience bridges 
this gap. After all, to show that all immediate sensations are 
in the mind, is not to show how knowledge occurs about 
things outside the mind. Merely seeing a thing in the mind 
is not knowing anything of the nature of say a real chair or 
table, such that if we do know things like real chairs and 
tables, we have yet t o  explain the nature of this knowledge. 
This brings us to another important aspect of Locke’s view, 
namely, what is called the representative theory of percep- 
tion. The  kernel of this thesis is well brought out by turning 
to Locke’s definitions of “idea” and “quality.” 
W e  have seen how, though the characteristic of the mind 
is to be active or  to operate upon things, it can allow itself 
to be passively operated upon by things. It is a t  this point 
of the mind’s lending itself t o  be operated upon that sensa- 
tion occurs. T h e  part  of the mind that is most intimately 
united to the body is itself capable of being causally affected 
by the motions in the sense-organs. One might almost say 
that in thus becoming passive, the mind acquires a kind of 
materiality in order to become capable of being moved by 
matter. T h a t  is, if mind did not here tend towards becoming 
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something that a moving particle could bump into, how could 
the said motion cause anything to happen to  mind?’ T h e  
only way an atom can cause anything is by collision, Locke 
himself has told us. And since the contact of matter with 
mind occurs in the region of the sense-organ, the sense-organ 
might be described either as matter blossoming forth into 
mind o r  as mind congealing into matter, to make causation 
between them possible. Now let us examine this “dense” 
region of the mind “immersed in flesh’’ as it is being stimu- 
lated by say the organ of sight. In  this mental region a 
colored patch appears as the effect of the physical stimula- 
tion, and this is what Locke calls a “simple” sensory idea, 
o r  idea of sensation. Likewise, there are simple sensory 
ideas resulting in the mind from touch or  smell or taste or 
hearing. Locke attempts no further definition of these simple 
sensory units, on the ground that what is so simple cannot 
be defined. Only what is complex is susceptible of definition. 
Let  him who would have acquaintance with the simple ideas 
of sense open his eyes and unstop his ears. If he is blind or  
deaf, he cannot know colors or  sounds. 
Now the ideas of sense are perceived to have certain quali- 
ties, and this a t  last brings us to the means of escape from 
the realm of mind into the realm of matter. Some of these 
qualities resemble the qualities of real physical objects, such 
that by knowing them in the mind, we shall, indirectly, obtain 
knowledge of the properties of bodies. For  example, the 
properties of being extended and moving in space, of being 
solid and numerable, are exhibited by the tactual and visual 
sensations. In  having direct acquaintance with these proper- 
ties in the mind, we have indirect knowledge, according to 
Locke, of the nature of physical objects, since such properties 
Strictly speaking, a moving particle does not “bump into” mind; when 
the particles of a sense organ move, a sensation is “annexed” to the motion. 
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in the mind are l ike  those in nature. These are called the 
“primary” qualities, because they resemble what they stand 
for. 
But our sensations or  sensory ideas have other properties 
besides the primary. F o r  example, anything clearly seen not 
only has the primary quality shape, but also color. Anything 
touched not only suggests the primary quality solidity, but 
also warmth or  cold. In short, there seems to be another 
class of properties which do not resemble anything in bodies 
in the same straight-forward way that the primary qualities 
do. A sensed red is not like any property of a body. Never- 
theless Locke calls them qualities of bodies in a rather queer 
sense. White, for example, may properly be called a prop- 
erty of our marble, in the sense that th,e particular order and 
motions of the atoms of the marble are such as to  produce 
in the mind the sensation of white when particles of light 
are reflected from the marble to the eye. W e  see, then, how 
indirectly the white qualifies the marble-not a t  all in the 
same direct way that say the shape of the marble qualifies it. 
Consequently, Locke calls i t  a “secondary” quality, and 
classes under this head all such as have real being only in 
the mind. Sounds, odors, tastes, pains, and sensations of 
temperature all share along with colors the same mind-bound 
existence. Except in the presence of some mind, there is noth- 
ing warm or  sweet or  colorful in the universe. And even in 
the presence of some mind, nothing in the universe is warm 
o r  sweet o r  colorful in the same simple way in which it is 
solid or extended in space.’ 
W e  have seen how the escape out of our minds into nature 
is accomplished by means of a relation of resemblance be- 
tween certain qualities of the contents of our minds and the 
Hence Cousin remarks that Loeke inclines toward materialism, despite 
the admission of immaterial substance or mind. PhiloJophie dc Lockc, p. 361. 
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qualities of objects in nature. And this view, that certain 
elements in the mind signify or stand for elements in nature, 
is the representative theory of perception. Besides resem- 
blance, however, Locke must mention something else to 
answer the question, why did it ever occur to the mind that 
there is, entirely outside it, a world of objects which in cer- 
tain respects are like its ideas? After all, if everything di- 
rectly experienced is in the mind, what could have ever 
suggested to this mind that there is a whole real world out- 
side it, even though there may be resemblance? A good part  
of our belief in the existence of an external world, Locke 
answers, rises out of the feeling we have of “actually re- 
ceiving”’ stimuli from an external non-mental source. T h a t  
is to say, over and above merely having ideas that happen to 
resemble material properties in certain respects, we also have 
an indefeasible sense that something is continually approach- 
ing the mind from without, to make contact with it, and to 
cause or  produce in it its sensations. Our sensations are ex- 
perienced as e fec t s ,  and that is sufficient in itself to prove 
the existence of their external causes. I t  is a feeling that if 
we could red ly  get outside of our minds and follow this 
causal sequence back out into nature, we would eventually 
arrive a t  the material object which is the source of stimula- 
tion. T h e  inference of its extramental existence is not a blind 
or  irrational one. Locke says we have unquestionable sensory 
evidence a t  least of the existence of things outside our minds, 
though of the precise nature of these things we may be com- 
paratively ignorant. T h a t  such sensory evidence however is 
really quite questionable, contrary to Locke’s belief, is shown 
by the sceptical development his theory of knowledge under- 
went in the hands of Berkely and Hume, who concluded that, 
for  all we know, nothing exists outside of mind. 
iv, 2, 14, and iv, 11, 2. 
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In conclusion, I shall comment briefly on the present-day 
status of the dualistic theory of perception. I t  is safe and 
just to say that no other theory of perception has as yet 
been formulated which, by its sheer adequacy, could rule out 
the dualistic theory as improbable. If you deal in all fair- 
ness with space, time, and causality, it almost seems that 
the dualistic theory is the only one you can arrive at. Broad, 
one of the most prominent and scientific of living philoso- 
phers, writes that the direct theory of perception has for 
all time been demonstrated false.’ And physicist Planck 
believes that the whole structure of physical science rests on 
the proposition that “the real outer world is not directly 
knowable.”’ Finally, among our American epistemologists, 
there is Lovejoy, whose powerful arguments for an out-and- 
out dualism have as yet received no refutation. 
Aside from such evidence, however, which clearly shows 
that Locke is perhaps even more alive now than when, three 
hundred years ago, his fingers could push pen over paper in 
defense of dualism, it seems to me that a dualistic theory of 
perception will not stand forever. M y  reason for this belief 
is what I shall call its “natural” inadequacy. As long as there 
are human organisms who live and think simply, there will 
b,e the conviction that objects are directly perceived. Dick 
will continue to believe that when he looks a t  Harry,  it is 
the real Har ry  that he sees with his eyes, and not some 
ghostly substitute for Har ry  in Dick‘s own mind. This will 
in the end, by sheer persistence, give birth to a theory of 
perception whieh, without ignoring the facts of physical 
science, will explain how Tom, Dick, and H a r r y  directly 
perceive one another. Such a theory, should it ever arise, 
will however give mankind no occasion to put up a black 
Mind and I ts  Place in Nature, pp. 184-185. 
2 Where I s  Science Going? p. 82.  
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mark beside the name of Locke. For  Locke’s own clear naive 
statement of the problem of perception will have contributed 
largely to the final non-dualistic solution. I t  is evident that 
Locke himself never pretended to have explained the details 
of the perceptual process. H e  avowedly had no theory of 
perception, when it came for example to showing how a sen- 
sation is “annexed” to the motion of particles in the stimu- 
la ted sense-organ. Consequently, our purpose here has been 
to clarify for  ourselves, as Locke did for himself, the prob- 
Zem of perception. Let him who has the wit pass on to its 
solution. Before he can, however, he must first have the wit 
t o  see the problem as clearly as Locke did. There is a way 
of recognizing a difficulty so intimately that, of this very 
intimacy with the problem, the solution is born. 
VIRGIL C. ALDRICH. 



